What has over the years surfaced as perhaps the central issue in the debate surrounding the problem of free will and determinism is the question whether determinism is compatible with responsibility. Recently, however, some philosophers have shifted this debate-rightly, I thinkasking not whether determinism and responsibility are compatible, but rather whether mechanism and responsibility are compatible.
Modal incompatibilism (i.e., the thesis that determinism (with its "necessity") and responsibility are incompatible) is explained by Gary Watson in this way:
Determinism is said to imply that certain criteria internal to our moral framework are never satisfied, for example, that we are all excused for our misconduct because not being able to do otherwise is an excuse. (Watson, p. 13) However, determinism talk always appears incongruous with, and remote from, the way we talk about moral matters, and hence we often have the intuition that determinism somehow cannot address our moral framework, much less invalidate one of its criteria. Explanatory incompatibilism (i.e., the thesis that mechanism and responsibility are incompatible) vindicates our intuition:
(I)t is not that determinism 4 implies the omnipresence of the usual excusing conditions, but that it calls into question the whole framework in which talk of exculpation makes sense. Our conduct would then have the status of natural forces. The reason these are not morally responsible agents is not that they couldn't have done otherwise; it is that they arc not telcological agents. (Watson, p. 13) Mechanism, then, does not attempt to address our moral framework; it supersedes it.
The shift from determinism talk to mechanism talk is not simply a change in the way we view some truth about the world. Whereas it is true that determinism implies mechanism and its explanatory restrictions, it is not true that mechanism implies determinism.
A fruitful and comprehensive explanatory scheme that was both mechanistic and inherently probabilistic would tend just as much (or little) to displace teleological accounts. (Watson, p. 13) Against this background I can now enter into the project of this essay, which is to examine an important article by Daniel C. Dennett on explanatory incompatibilism, appropriately titled " Mechanism and 4 Watson waits until the end of his discussion on explanatory incompatibilism to make a clear break between determinism and mechanism (see Watson, p. 13); before that he treats mechanism as another way to think about determinism, and thus has explanatory incompatibilists and modal incompatibilists alike talking about determinism and what it implies. This is one such instance. Little violence would be done to the text if "mechanism" were inserted here for "determinism", since this is really what Watson has in mind.
1.
Dennett starts out the first section of "Mechanism and Responsibility" by telling us that "mechanism is here to stay, unlike determinism and its denial, which go in and out of fashion." (Dennett, p. 150) However, this permanence of mechanism, brought on by its success in describing people and other things, is supposedly disturbing, since ...whenever a particular bit of human motion can be given an entirely mechanistic explanation...any non-mechanistic, rational purposive explanation of the same motions is otiose. (Dennett, p. 150) Indeed, it seems that purposive explanations are not only rendered otiose, but are false, a claim Dennett describes as the principle that "the mechanistic displaces the purposive" (hereafter, the "displacement principle"), and which he states like this:
...any mechanistic (or causal) explanation of human motions takes priority over, indeed renders false, any explanation in terms of desires, beliefs, intention. (Dennett, p. 151) Since this is supposed to be a problem for the believer in responsibility, according to Dennett, it is implied that responsibility somehow requires the purposive kind of explanation which is rendered false. The argument which arises out of this proceeds from the claims that (1) there exist mechanistic explanations of human motion, (2) mechanistic explanations render rational, purposive explanations false, and (3) responsibility presupposes such rational, purposive explanations, to the conclusion (4) there is no responsibility. Dennett wishes to deny this conclusion, and since the inference appears to be valid, he denies one of the premissed claims, that being that mechanistic explanations falsify purposive ones.
In order to show the displacement principle to be faulty, Dennett realizes that he needs to get clear on the elements of this principle, something he does in sections II, III, and IV. I discuss two of Dennett's elaborations here. Responsibility."
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The two goals of my examination are (1) the brief formulation of Dennett's compatibilist project, and (2) the criticism and replacement of one of Dennett's major arguments. My work towards these two goals will correspond respectively to the two parts of this paper.
1. The displacement principle has to do with two types of explanation, one mechanistic and the other purposive. Within the latter, which Dennett prefers to term 'Intentional,' arises our notion of responsibility, and for good reason:
Intentional explanations..x\\c thoughts, desires, beliefs, intentions, rather than chemical reactions, explosions, electric impulses, in explaining the occurrence of human motions. (Dennett, p. 152) More to the point, though, the crucial difference between these explanation kinds for Dennett is that the Intentional explanation gives a rationale for the explicandum, and the mechanistic explanation does not. The latter is to be considered just a causal story, whereas the former is more. 6 2. Intentional explanations are given from the Intentional stance, which carries with it an assumption of rationality for the entity whose behaviour is explained. However, this stance, which involves talk of responsibility, does not necessarily involve moral responsibility; that is the province of the moral (or personal) stance. The moral stance, though, does presuppose the Intentional stance, and the importance of this fact is emphasized by Dennett in concluding section IV:
The ethical implication to be extracted from the distinction of stance is not that the Intentional stance is a moral stance, but that it is a precondition of any moral stance, and hence if it is jeopardized by any triumph of mechanism, the notion of moral responsibility is jeopardized in turn. (Dennett, p. 160) We can now reformulate Dennett's project in virtue of these elaborations. This is the complete argument which Dennett needs to defeat:
1. Human motion is explainable from the mechanistic stance. 2
The mechanistic stance precludes the Intentional stance. 3. The moral stance presupposes the Intentional stance. 4
Moral responsibility assumes explanation from the moral stance.
As Dennett writes, he is interested in establishing "that Intentional explanations are at least not causal explanations simpliciter." (Dennett, "Mechanism," p. 152) This entire paragraph 1. is an elaboration on Dennett's section II. Dennett wishes here to deny premiss 2., once again claiming that the mechanistic and Intentional stances are compatible. This affords a general view of Dennett's project in terms of its objective and its context. However, a fuller picture is possible by making one contrast between Dennett and others who talk about responsibility.
Dennett talks about human motions being explainable from different stances, but many others consider human actions as the proper locus of reference in determining responsibility. The motivation for Dennett's policy appears to be this: by using a neutral term for those things which are describablc as actions or as "mere" events, one does not prejudice either the Intentional or mechanistic stance. To those who use the term "action" in developing arguments either for or against human responsibility, Dennett may well claim that such use carries with it a presupposition of the Intentional stance, where by definition talk about reasons, desires, and intentions will apply, and talk solely about causes won't 2 Sections I though IV in "Mechanism and. Responsibility" present Dennett's compatibilist project, something I have briefly formulated in part 1. Here I wish to analyze Dennett's attempt in section V to fulfill part of that project; 8 an attempt, specifically, to rebut an argument by A.C. Maclntyre for the incompatibility of the mechanistic and Intentional stances. My general scheme here will be to (1) present the very words of Maclntyre which Dennett cites and draws upon, (2) explain and critique Dennett's formulation of, and response, to, Maclntyre, (3) reinterpret Maclntyre's argument, and finally (4) present a criticism to Maclntyre which Dennett should employ in light of the reinterpretation.
Dennett begins his consideration of Maclntyre by quoting a few passages from one section of Maclntyre's article, "Determinism." 9 The cited passages are as follows:
Behaviour is rational-in this arbitrarily, defined sense-if, and only if, it can be influenced, or inhibited by the adducing of some logically relevant consideration....But this means that if a man's behaviour is rational it cannot be determined by the state of glands or any other antecedent causal factor. For if giving a man more or better information or suggesting a new argument to him is a both necessary and sufficient condition for, as we say, changing his mind, then we exclude, for this occasion at least, the possibility of other sufficient conditions-Thus to show that behaviour is rational is enough to show that it is not causally determined in the sense of being the effect of a set of sufficient conditions operating independently of the agent's deliberation or possibility of deliberation. So the discoveries of the physiologist and psychologist may indefinitely increase our knowledge of why men behave irrationally but they could never show that rational behaviour in this sense was causally determined.
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Dennett believes the most fundamental point to come out of what Maclntyre says above is the "misleading suggestion" that ...the existence of sufficient conditions for events in a system puts that system in a strait-jacket, as it were, and thus denies it the flexibility required of a truly rational system. (Dennett, p. 161) Dennett takes this to imply the incompatibility of the mechanistic and Intentional stances, presumably via reasoning something like this: Rationality, for Maclntyre, entails a lack of, and thus independence from, sufficient (causal) conditions, meaning that if such conditions do exist (i.e., if mechanistic explanation is in principle applicable) then the system under scrutiny is somehow "programmed," and thus non-rational (hence, a presupposition of Intentional explanation is false). How Dennett actually formulates Maclntyre's argument for the latter's 'suggestion' and the incompatibilism it implies, plus how Dennett in turn responds to this argument, is what must now be investigated.
Dennett outlines the Maclntyre argument as one based on the idea of tropistic behaviour; behaviour, in other words, done solely in response to, or under the direct control of, a stimulus. To illustrate the concept, Dennett uses an example from Dean Wooldridge 11 of an egg-carrying wasp which, being first thought to act in a rational manner when preparing to lay her eggs, is later discovered to be acting from a very simple routine of stimuli, and thus isn't considered rational. For example, the wasp always leaves a cricket which it has paralyzed (which is to be food for the newly hatched wasp grubs) on the threshold of the burrow to be used for hatching, goes inside to inspect the hole, and then comes out to drag the cricket inside. , 1985) , pp. 526-46, the root of which comes from the genus (Sphex) of the digger wasp we encountered above.) The fear is that we may be like the wasp in the respect that "she is not a free agent, but rather at the mercy of brute physical causation, driven inexorably into her states and activities by features of the environment outside her control." (Dennett, Elbow Room, p. 11) Compare this with Hofstadter, "Paradox," pp. 529-538. The underlying idea here is brought out nicely in Dennett, Elbow Room:
If, while the wasp is inside making her preliminary inspection the cricket is moved a few inches away, the wasp, on emerging from the burrow, will bring the cricket back to the threshold, but not inside, and will then repeat the preparatory procedure of entering the burrow to see that everything is all right. If again the cricket is removed a few inches while the wasp is inside, once again the wasp will move the cricket up to the threshold and re-enter the borrow for a final check. The wasp never thinks of pulling the cricket straight in.
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The wasp's behaviour is a tropism because the mechanism which governs it is finite-i.e., at some degree of complexity there are relevant distinctions to be made but these fall outside of the mechanism's scope, and thus go unheeded. The extrapolation we are to make from this is that we are, in principle, no different from the wasp. We may be incredibly more complex, but our behaviour, being controlled by a finite mechanism, is tropistic.
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Dennett sees Maclntyre correctly contending that "any system that can be explained mechanistically-at whatever length-must be in an extended sense tropistic." 14 (The tropism interpretation appears to arise from the straitjackct/flexibility metaphor which Dennett uses in characterizing Maclntyre's 'misleading suggestion'. See passage quoted above.) But what does this all-pervasive tropism mean except that any mechanistic system (presumably including the human one) fails to react to some 'logically relevant considerations'? Indeed, just as the wasp doesn't take note of having checked the burrow before, but repeats the procedure of bringing the cricket to the threshold and then entering to check the burrow again, so we must not take note of everything relevant.
15
At this point, Dennett would have Maclntyre bring in his definition of rationality-that being, roughly, the capacity to be affected by some logically relevant consideration-and thus conclude that if we are like the wasp we are indeed not rational. (Notice, however, that this move requires Dennett to interpret Maclntyre's "rationality" as "the capacity to be affected by any logically relevant consideration.") But if we are not rational (by virtue of mechanism, via our tropistic nature), then for Dennett this amounts to a denial of the applicability of the Intentional stance, and thus we can conclude that the mechanistic stance precludes the Intentional stance.
Dennett's version of Maclntyre's argument runs then like this:
.brains are meaning manipulators, information processors,...semantic engines, (p. 28) ...as physical mechanisms |brains| can only be syntactic engines, responding only to structural or formal properties, (p. 28) Since meaning does not reside, like some rare ore, in physical features of stimuli, no alchemical extraction process could distill it and respond to it. (p. 28)
...brains only approximate the behavior of the (ideal, pure) semantic engine. The perfect semantic engine, the perfect Kantian rational will, is indeed friction-free, infinitely alert to nuances of meaning, perfectly invulnerable to sphexishness-and physically impossible, (p.
See also Dennett's comments on how "the proof in computability theory that the 'halting problem' has no solution" shows that there could be no finite, nonmagical, perfect self-watcher. (Dennett, Elbow Room, p. 31) 15 Notice that I cannot be much more specific than this, since a list of the things which arc known (a) to exist and (b) to be totally outside of our ken, would smack of self-contradiction.
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The thesis is implied by this passage:
...the only implication that could be drawn from the general thesis of man's ultimately mechanistic organization would be that man must, then, be imperfectly rational, in the sense that he cannot be so designed as to ensure rational responses to all contingencies, hardly an alarming or counter intuitive finding... (Dennett, "Mechanism, 1. Any system capable of being explained from the mechanistic stance is tropistic. 2. If a system is tropistic, then there are logically relevant considerations by which it is not affected. 3. If there are logically relevant considerations by which a system is not affected, then that system is not rational. 4. If a system is not rational, then the Intentional stance is not applicable. Thus 5. Any system capable of being explained from the mechanistic stance is not explainable from the Intentional stance.
Dennett must reject the conclusion in line 5., and since the argument appears to be valid, he is committed to denying at least one of the premisses leading to that conclusion. I believe Dennett denies premiss 3., since he sees it implying a maximally restrictive notion of rationality, disagreeable since it follows from it, he believes, that no one (indeed, no thing) is rational. Rationality, for Dennett, admits of degrees; it makes sense to say one person (or one thing) is more rational than another. 16 Maclntyre, through premiss 3., characterizes rationality as an ideal to be approached but never attained. This contrast is brought out in an important passage in which Dennett explains why the fact that human beings are finitely mechanistic systems and thus tropistic does not mean that we are not rational or Intentionally explainable:
...although in the case of the wasp we can say that its behaviour has been shown to be merely mechanically controlled, what force would the 'merely' have if we were to entertain the notion that the control of man's more versatile behaviour is merely mechanical?
The denigration might well be appropriate if in a particular case the mechanical explanation of a bit of behaviour was short and sweet....but we must also consider cases in which the physiologist or cybernetician hands us twenty volumes of fine print and says, 'Here is the design of this man's behavioural control system*. Here is a case where the philosopher's preference for simple examples leads him astray, for of course any simple mechanistic explanation of a bit of behaviour will disqualify it for plausible Intentional characterization, make it a mere happening and not an action, but we cannot generalize from simple examples to complex, for it is precisely the simplicity of the examples that grounds the crucial conclusion. (Dennett, p. 163) Dennett is saying that although Maclntyre is right to infer our tropistic nature from the facts that (a) the wasp is tropistic and (b) we are like the wasp in being mechanistically explainable, he is not right in making his further inference. Even though we are like the wasp in our tropism, it does not follow that we are alike in rationality or susceptibility to Intentional explanation. The reason is this: rationality is not a function of whether we heed all logically relevant considerations or whether we are mechanistically explainable, but a function of how many considerations we heed and how complex our mechanism. The predictive power, and thus the applicability, of the Intentional stance (with its assumption of rationality) is brought out as the tropistic nature of systems is made more and more complex.
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So, it is not the case that any system which is not affected by some logically relevant consideration is not rational, but that it is imperfectly rational in inverse proportion to the complexity of the system's mechanism. This is what I think to be a plausible reading of Dennett's response to Maclntyre.
Dennett's reply to the argument he has characterized as Maclntyre's seems correct. However, I am not convinced that the argument which is responded to is in fact Maclntyre's. Below, I shall present three reasons for doubting Dennett's interpretation, after which I will reinterpret Maclntyre's argument and look for a response to it which Dennett could use.
First, it is unclear that Dennett has correctly interpreted Maclntyre's definition of rationality as (roughly) "the capacity to be affected by some (i.e., any) logically relevant consideration." Another reading, which seems to be the prima facie obvious one, renders rationality as "the capacity to be affected by some (i.e., at least one) logically relevant consideration." Under this interpretation, many systems are classified as rational, with distinctions made within the class based upon how many considerations are heeded. Notice two things about this reading: (1) it would rule out premiss 3. in the Dennett rendition of Maclntyre's argument, making 17 What Dennett has in mind in the passage quoted immediately above is elaborated on in Dennett, Elbow Room. There the author uses the notion of an intuition pump (roughly, a thought experiment which emphasizes the "important" features of the case at hand to arrive at a particular intuition) which ignores complexity to explain the erroneous inference from sphcxishness to non-rationality. (See Dennett, Elbow Room, p. 12, (31) (32) (33) (34) In Maclntyre, there is nearly a page-long gap between the first and second passages. (See Maclntyre, pp. 248-9) However, 1 believe Dennett's "compression" of Maclntyre' words preserves the inferential connection which Maclntyre creates between the passages. Dennett's version untenable and his response to it superfluous, and (2) it highly resembles Dennett's own idea of rationality.
Second, is it plain that Maclntyre's argument can be accurately captured within Dennett's model of tropistic behaviour? Dennett points toward tropism talk by using his strait-jacket/flexibility metaphor to characterize Maclntyre's 'misleading suggestion'. But Maclntyre never talks about tropism, strait-jackets, or the like, and so without further elaboration from Dennett we are justified in being a little skeptical.
Third, Dennett's interpretation of the argument ignores Maclntyre's flow of reasoning. Dennett wants to show Maclntyre as starting with a connection between mechanism and tropism, then adding his definition of rationality, and finally concluding with incompatibilism. However, as the cited passages shows, Maclntyre starts with his definition of rationality; the second passage (beginning 'But this means that ...') follows from the definition in some way, and the third passage (beginning Thus...") follows from the second.
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Given the above considerations, an alternative to Dennett's interpretation of the Maclntyre argument should at least be entertained. The interpretation I will develop here is more literal than Dennett's, and as a result avoids the last two potential difficulties just outlined. The interpretation also ignores any dispute over the proper rendering of Maclntyre's definition of rationality, and thus avoids the first objection as well.
The Maclntyre quotation cited by Dennett contains three distinct but interconnected passages. The first page gives us the definition of rational behaviour as behaviour which "can be influenced, or inhibited by the adducing of some logically relevant consideration." Thus, this capacity to be affected by the right things lies at the heart of the idea of rationality.
The third passage represents the conclusion with which Dennett takes issue. The key segment is this:
...to show that behaviour is rational is enough to show that it is not causally determined... Thus, rationality (along with Intentional explanation) precludes causal (i.e., mechanistically explainable) determination, and vice-versa. Now something has happened between the first passage, which gives us a definition of rationality, and this third passage about the incompatibility of rationality and causal determination. In the second passage, we are supposedly to find a justificatory bridge from one to the other. The key segment here is as follows:
...if a man's behaviour is rational it cannot be determined by the state of his glands or any other antecedent causal factor.
